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“WE HAVE LIVED TOO LONG IN A STRATEGY-FREE MODE.” – 
JAMES N. MATTIS[1]
 A S S U M P T I O N S  A N D  S T R AT E G Y
Former Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis identified a lack of strategy and strategic thinking in 
the United States’ national security policy discourse. This problem is complex, multifaceted, and 
caused by a number of factors, including a lack of understanding of what strategy is, and is not, and 
how to educate strategists, an inability or unwillingness to identify and understand core strategic 
issues, the tyranny of the present, and a fickle public. This article alleviates some of the challenges of 
living in a strategy-free mode by focusing on the development of strategic thinking and strategies 
that are based on empirically realistic assumptions consistent with decision making and behavior in 
the real world. Relying on assumptions, both implicit and explicit, that are false, unrealistic, or 
assume away the difficult parts of problems results in what might be called “assumptionitis.”[2] 
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Assumptionitis undermines useful strategic analysis, much less policy recommendations, because it is 
unlikely the real world will unfold in ways consistent with this kind of analysis. Optimistic 
assumptions regarding the reaction of the Iraqi people and the conditions that would prevail 
following the 2003 invasion, for example, crippled the effort to effectively plan for, and cope with, 
post-invasion Iraq.[3] There is no easy cure for assumptionitis, but empirically-grounded, 
interdisciplinary thinking can make our assumptions more realistic and, thus, strategies more 
meaningful.
E X A M P L E S  O F  A S S U M P T I O N I T I S  
Strategy is a process of identifying, creating, and exploiting asymmetries to develop long-term 
competitive advantages. Strategy, by its nature, involves multiple, and often overlapping, steps, 
including thinking about creative ways to identify and exploit asymmetries, understanding and 
analyzing trends in the changing strategic environment, and integrating and synthesizing 
information to lead, shape, and manage strategic changes in our organizations in order to implement 
strategy. Given the dynamism inherent in today’s geostrategic environment, strategy must be both 
deliberate and emergent to facilitate strategic management and learning, respectively.[4] This entails 
basing strategy on the world as it is so that it is useful for practical action.
Assumptions are key to getting strategy right, but they are oftentimes flawed, unrealistic, and 
difficult to change because strategists tend to view the world based on what is familiar to them. 
Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara described this phenomenon: “We see what we 
want to believe.”[5] Entrenched beliefs prevent cognitive agility and seeing the need for 
conceptualizing the world in different ways. This is particularly damaging in a world that is 
changing quickly and in often unpredictable ways. The increasing and overwhelming amount of 
information available only compounds this problem. As Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon noted, “[A] 
wealth of information creates a poverty of attention,” which makes critical and strategic thinking 
even more important.[6] 
Academic disciplines and textbooks can exacerbate the tendency for making erroneous assumptions 
by approaching decision making, including strategic decision making, from the point of view of just 
one or two disciplines rather than starting with the empirical behavior of humans. Kahn and Mann 
warn, “[M]any analysts do become enamored of intellectual and mechanical gadgets . . . They are 
easily seduced into emphasizing the use of such tools rather than focusing attention on the real 
problems.”[7] This tendency manifests itself especially in the mistaken assumption of unbounded 
human rationality.[8] Noticing the need for a more realistic conception of humans, Simon, a pioneer 
in the fields of behavioral economics and artificial intelligence, observed, “Nothing is more 
fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research methods than our view of 
the nature of the human being whose behavior we are studying.”[9] Thus, strategic thinking and 
analysis begins with an understanding of human nature and the limits to rationality, even if–or, 
perhaps, especially if–it challenges favorite tools and models. 
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Assumptionitis sets in when one set of actors project their own objectives and values onto others. 
One problem with the Rational Man perspective–or any other theory that assumes homogeneity 
across preferences, cultures, and countries; is that it does not always happen that people invest the 
time to try to understand where others, e.g., countries, cultures, are coming from. As a result, one set 
of actors assumes that others have the same objectives as themselves even though two groups rarely 
agree on what is rational. This approach to forming assumptions about an opponent’s decisions or 
actions is a poor foundation upon which to build strategic thinking and planning. It can, for 
instance, lead to neglecting the nuances in how countries view national power, which influences 
their strategic objectives, how their strategic fears may influence what they do, and the operational 
code behind their decision making.[10] Additionally, when homogeneity is assumed and static tools 
and models are applied to a changing environment, another deleterious assumption occurs: that the 
enemy is static and is not also trying to enact countermeasures and identify competitive advantages 
to exploit.[11] 
STRATEGY IS NOT SIMPLY PRECONCEIVED AND CRAFTED 
THROUGH A DELIBERATE PROCESS, BUT ALSO EMERGES  
FROM PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR THAT DEVELOP AND 
REQUIRE INTERVENTION TO FACILITATE LEARNING AND 
ADAPTATION WHEN APPROPRIATE.
A result of assuming homogeneity in rationality and objectives is difficulty in forecasting future 
security environments or conflicts. In a speech to the cadets at West Point, former Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates observed, “[W]hen it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next 
military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it 
right.”[12] To identify and understand future conflicts, we must first look at the world as it is, 
understand trends and how they can lead to asymmetries, and understand others through their own 
eyes and perspectives as opposed to through our own. Otherwise, all things are sudden and 
confusing to the willfully blind. Leaders must detect emerging patterns and strategies in their own 
organizations as well. Strategy is not simply preconceived and crafted through a deliberate process, 
but also emerges  from patterns of behavior that develop and require intervention to facilitate 
learning and adaptation when appropriate.[13] 
Another symptom of assumptionitis includes adopting a form of linear thinking in our views of 
organizations. Assumptionitis manifests itself in assuming strategy implementation is automatic and 
that once started, a plan or policy progresses smoothly toward the desired end state. This, however, is 
rarely the case due to many factors, such as bureaucratic and organizational inertias, that create 
friction and inhibit the smooth functioning of strategic implementation. In his memoirs, Secretary 
Gates, for example, lamented how the most important wars he fought were the internal 
organizational and bureaucratic ones.[14] 
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND PROBLEM-DRIVEN APPROACHES 
FOCUS ON THE PROBLEM, NOT ON THE TECHNOLOGIES, 
THEORIES, MODELS, OR TEXTBOOK ANALYSES WE PREFER. 
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Assumptions about the future based on extrapolating relative-success in the past, and based on a 
short-term horizon can be dangerous. The past is of course important to crafting strategy, which 
Mintzberg offers “requires a natural synthesis of the future, present, and past.”[15] However, it’s also 
crucial to be “attuned to existing patterns [and] able to perceive important breaks in them.”[16] A 
myopic focus on the next news or election cycle undermines a strategic mindset and underscores the 
importance of establishing broad strategic objectives to serve as guideposts. In the absence of such 
guideposts, Secretary Schlesinger warns, “[O]ur policies will be determined by impulse and 
image.”[17] He says that the U.S. can only succeed “if we are sufficiently disciplined to select those 
tasks, few in number, that truly involve the longer-term interests of this society–and avoid becoming 
sidetracked by the many lesser tasks (brought to our attention by an enterprising news industry) that 
would exhaust the patience of the American public.”[18] 
OV E RCO M I N G  A S S U M P T I O N I T I S  W I T H  E M PI R I C A L LY  G RO U N D E D ,  
I N T E R D I S C I P L I N A RY  T H I N K I N G
There is no easy fix for assumptionitis. However, there are some approaches and ideas that can help 
mitigate making assumptions that lead us to misguided policy that is difficult, if not impossible, to 
implement–or worse, lead us in unproductive, perhaps even dangerous, directions. In particular, we 
suggest the following can improve our understanding and practice of strategy:
●       Interdisciplinary and problem-driven approaches focus on the problem, not on the 
technologies, theories, models, or textbook analyses we prefer. The U.S. Air Force, for example, uses 
the “Kessel Run” approach in which they assemble a team of recognized experts in various disciplines 
to dive deeply on a challenge to identify and truly understand its nature before determining what 
they should try to do about it. This approach can be employed at the strategic level as well, but the 
people involved should not be the daily decision-makers. Expecting already busy people to perform 
this type of analysis is unrealistic. Furthermore, expecting this type of analysis to be done quickly–
e.g., within a given news cycle–would further complicate and likely undermine the effort. Patience is 
key to getting it right. Organizationally, General David H. Berger’s desire to establish a strategic 
thinking capability for the U.S. Marine Corps is another potentially useful step in this direction that 
other organizations could benefit from as well.[19]
THINKING CRITICALLY REQUIRES STUDENT-CENTERED, 
TRANSFORMATIONAL LEARNING, NOT ROTE 
MEMORIZATION OF MATERIALS AND IDEAS PASSIVELY 
ABSORBED FROM INSTRUCTORS AND TEXTBOOKS. 
●       Interdisciplinary does not mean simply applying one’s favorite theory, model, or technology to 
multiple different domains, areas, or data sets. Rather, strategic analysis needs to be rooted in real 
world problems that are understood through multiple lenses and constantly evolving 
interdisciplinary frameworks, not static theories. As such, engaging in active open-mindedness and 
seeking to truly understand the problem by viewing it from different vantage points and trying to 
disprove our hypotheses would prove useful and mitigate our penchant for locking in on a pet 
theory and trying to make the problem fit the theory. Broad, holistic thinking about strategy might 
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mitigate some of the trained incapacity for strategic thinking when siloed away in particular 
academic disciplines. Mintzberg, for example, notes that while strategic planning is analytic in 
nature, “strategy creation is essentially a process of synthesis.”[20]
●       Active minds capable of holistic, interdisciplinary thinking are best developed using active 
learning approaches. Instead of teaching people what to think, the emphasis needs to be placed on 
teaching how to think critically about the world around us. Thinking critically requires student-
centered, transformational learning, not rote memorization of materials and ideas passively absorbed 
from instructors and textbooks. 
●       Identifying and articulating strategic interests or guideposts can foster a longer view of 
challenges. British statesman and Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, for example, famously explained, 
“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and 
perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”[21] Secretary Mattis similarly provided 
guidance in the 2018 National Defense Strategy that he intended to help “reclaim an era of strategic 
purpose.”[22] 
Assumptionitis undermines useful strategy and strategic thinking. In this article, we identified some 
of its symptoms, as well as an empirically grounded, interdisciplinary approach we hope can be 
useful. While there are certainly others that deserve attention, we hope our recognition of these 
pitfalls can help us build some immunity against the unhealthy long-term effects assumptionitis can 
wreak on behaviorally realistic, meaningful strategy. 
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